China’s shadow lending system might be trying its hand at sub-prime banking. And in case China’s real estate market goes, it will probably be what exactly George Soros has become warning about since January as he announced he was shorting the regional currency, the renmimbi.

The China Banking Regulatory Commission said over the weekend that Shanghai banks can no longer cooperating with six mortgage brokers for a minimum of one month for violating lending policies. Branches of seven commercial banks admitted on Monday that they can suspend mortgage lending for clients brokered by those six firms for just two months in an attempt to clamp upon 房貸, the Shanghai office of the Commission said.

It’s unclear exactly what China means through the “gray market”, but it really does look like mortgage brokers in addition to their partner banks will work as time passes to obtain investors and first-timers in a home as China’s economy slows.

If it is happening in Shanghai, think of the interior provinces where you will discover a housing glut and they tend to be more dependent on real estate business for revenue.

The central and western provinces have already been hit hard by the slowdown in the whole economy and as a result, existing property supply can be a hard sell, Macquarie Capital analysts led by Ian Roper wrote in a report covered by Bloomberg on Monday. Another wave newest housing construction won’t aid to resolve the oversupply issue during these regions, and mortgage lenders can be using some “ancient Chinese secrets” to either unload these to buyers or fund them a little more creatively.

To a few observers, this looks a bit an excessive amount of like just what the seeds of your housing and economic crisis all rolled into one.

The creative goods that wiped out United states housing in 2008 — known as mortgaged backed securities and collateralized debt obligations bound to sub-prime mortgages — was a massive, trillion dollar market. That’s untrue in China. But that mortgage backed securities marketplace is growing. As is China’s debt market. China’s debt doesn’t pay a hell of any lot, so some investors seeking a bigger bang might go downstream and find themselves in uncharted Chinese waters with derivative products stuffed with unsavory real estate property obligations.

The Chinese securitization market took off this past year and it is now approaching $100 billion. It is Asia’s biggest, outpacing Japan by three to one.

Leading the drive are big state-owned banks just like the ones in Shanghai which have temporarily shut down entry to their loans from questionable mortgage firms. Others from the derivatives business include mid-sized financial firms trying to package loans into collateralized loan obligations (CLO), which can be different than CDOs insofar as they are not pools of independent mortgages. However, CLOs may include loans to housing developers reliant on those independent mortgages.

China’s housing bubble is distinct as compared to the United states because — to date — we have seen no foreclosure crisis and also the derivatives market that feeds off home mortgages is small. Moreover, China home buyers must make large down payments. What resulted in the sub-prime housing industry in the U.S. was the practice by mortgage brokers to approve applications of those people who had no money to put down on the house. China avoids that, on paper, due to the down payment requirement.

Precisely what is not clear is the thing that real estate property developers are adhering to that policy, and who seems to be not. And then in the instance where that type of debt gets packed into a derivative product, then China’s credit becomes a concern.

The marketplace for asset backed securities in China has expanded thanks to a new issuance system. Further healthy growth and development of financial derivatives may help pull a substantial sum from the country’s notoriously opaque shadow banking sector and place it back on banks’ books, giving China more transparency.

But Shanghai’s crackdown this weekend reveals that authorities are keeping a close eye on mortgage loan brokers even when the “gray market” is just not necessarily linked to derivatives.

Kingsley Ong, an associate at lawyer Eversheds International who helped draft China’s asset-backed security laws in 2007, called the opportunity of securitization in China “nearly unlimited”.

Lacking industry experience and widespread failure to disclose 房屋貸款 have raised questions regarding its ultimate influence on the broader economy.

All of this “eerily resembles what went down during the economic crisis within the U.S. in 2007-08, which had been similarly fueled by credit growth,” Soros said during the meeting at the Asia dexlpky85 in Ny on April 20. “Many of the money that banks are supplying is necessary to keep bad debts and loss-making enterprises alive,” he said.

That goes for housing developers trying to find buyers and — perhaps — the mortgage brokers and banks willing to assist them to keep businesses afloat.

Rutledge told the China Economic Review back in November there was a real risk.

China’s securitization market took shape in April of 2005 but was suspended in 2009 as a result of United states housing crisis and its link with the derivatives market China is currently building. Regulators lifted the ban on mortgage backed securities in May 2012, though they outlawed re-securitization products and synthetic CDOs, that happen to be CDOs of CDOs, the uicide squeeze that helped kill dozens of American banks including Lehman and Bear Stearns.